# Incident

incident_title: 20211226_MetaDAO_S
incident_date: 2021-12-26
incident_description:
Early this morning, PeckShield, a blockchain security company, issued an alert that MetaDAO had made off with 800 ETH, worth over $3.2 million at press time, in an apparent rug pull scam. MetaDAO then transferred the stolen funds to Tornado Cash, a privacy protocol that allows users to hide their Ethereum transactions and that theoretically allows for greater anonymity. 


incident_title: 20210629_MerlinLab_RS
incident_date: 2021-06-29
incident_description:
Via the smart contract, a hacker deposited 0.1WBNB into the vault and then manually transferred 1000BNB into the contract to trick the contract into thinking it has received 1000BNB in rewards, which resulted in the minter producing MERL rewards. (@Rekt)Merlin was hacked due to a logic flaw in MerlinStrategyalPacabnb. Merlin's smart contract is responsible for transferring the attacker's assets into Pancakeswap to get the CAKE reward. Cake rewards are directly transferred to the Cake pool for the next round of compound interest; The attacker calls getReward() function, which is the same as Bunny's vulnerability. Cack is injected in large quantities, so that the attacker can get a large number of Merlin rewards. 


incident_title: 20200419_LendfMe_S
incident_date: 2020-04-19
incident_description:
The main logic behind these two incidents is the incompatibility between ERC777 and those DeFi smart contracts (Reentrancy with imBTC)


incident_title: 20211003_Compound_SR
incident_date: 2021-10-03
incident_description:
Now another ~$68.8M has been sent to the vulnerable vault, and even more COMP is being given away. Any user could call drip() on Compound’s Reservoir vault, which would refill the Comptroller and allow for even more incorrect COMP distribution. 


incident_title: 20200913_bzx_CS
incident_date: 2020-09-13
incident_description:
DeFi lending protocol bZx was attacked again. This time hackers drained a little more over $8 million worth of cryptocurrencies leveraging a duplication bug that enabled them to make away with 219,199.66 LINK, 4,502.70 ETH, 1,756,351.27 USDT, 1,412,048.48 USDC, 667,988.62 DAI. iToken duplication bug-“double dip” problem allowing attackers to execute an exploit.


incident_title: 20210518_Venus_CS
incident_date: 2021-05-18
incident_description:
The manipulation of XVS price— the governance token of Venus Protocol on BSC resulted in $200M+ DeFi liquidations and a $100M+ of protocol bad debt.


incident_title: 20220320_Lifinance_S
incident_date: 2022-03-20
incident_description:
On March 20th, 2022, an attacker exploited LI.FI’s smart contract, specifically our swapping feature which allows us to perform swaps before bridging. Instead of actually swapping, they were able to call token contracts directly in the context of our contract.As a result of the exploit, anyone who gave infinite approval to our contract was vulnerable


incident_title: 20210622_ElevenFinance_CSR
incident_date: 2021-06-22
incident_description:
Eleven Finance was exploited to drain a number of vaults at the loss about $4.6 million. The incident was due to a bug that allows the attacker to withdraw funds without burning any shares. While it appears to be a flashloan attack, it is a flashswap-assisted one. (4 malicious contract, 5 attacks)


incident_title: 20210810_PunkProtocol_CSR
incident_date: 2021-08-10
incident_description:
On Aug 10th, Punk Protocol was hacked for $8.95M, ~$5M of which was later returned. "The Punk post-mortem details the vulnerability that led to the attack, and describes the root cause as a missing Modifier in the initialize() function within the CompoundModel code.
The hacker used delegateCall() to replace what should have been the protocol’s forgeAddress with their own malicious contract, as a parameter of the CompoundModel’s initialize() function.The lack of an “initializer” Modifier meant that the manipulated function was executed despite being associated with an unknown (and in this case malicious) contract.With the contract address now updated, the attacker was then able to call withdrawToForge, sending the assets controlled by the CompoundModel directly to the malicious contract, and into their wallet."


incident_title: 20210816_XSURGE_S
incident_date: 2021-08-16
incident_description:
On August 17, news broke that the DeFi protocol XSURGE on the BSC was attacked by a flash loan, and the stolen amount was worth 5 million U.S. dollars. Analyzing the attack transaction, the attacker borrowed BNB through lightning loan to purchase surge tokens, and then continued to sell and buy again, and finally arbitrage out of the market. Analysis of the token source code reveals that the cause of this vulnerability is the sell function in the contract The resulting reentrancy vulnerability.


incident_title: 20210603_PancakeHunny_S
incident_date: 2021-06-03
incident_description:
This is not a Flash Loan attack.None of the Bunny and Bunny fork attacks is a Flash Loan attack. They are Performance Fee Minting Attacks. They just often get amplified/made easier with Flash Loans.Using all the wallet balance to make HUNNYBNB LP, and then uses it to calculate the profit hunnyBnbAmount, which can be easily tampered with by just sending the tokens to the minter contract.


incident_title: 20210730_Levyathan_CSR
incident_date: 2021-07-30
incident_description:
leyvathan.finance was subject to an attack on July 30th 2021, resulting in the minting of 100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 $LEV tokens and price drop to near 0. [1] The Levyathan developers left the private keys to a wallet with minting capability available on Github.
[2] As a result of the exploit, users were forced to use emergencyWithdraw() to attempt to retrieve their staked tokens.However, the emergencyWithdraw() logic contained a bug which referenced rewardDebt (a variable related to reward calculation) instead of user.amount as the quantity of tokens to be withdrawn.


incident_title: 20210623_StableMagnet_RS
incident_date: 2021-06-23
incident_description:
The StableMagnet Automated Market Maker (AMM) has perpetrated a rugpull on their users in an initial attack valued upwards of $22 million. According to an analysis by REKT, that figure has now grown to $27 million and continues to rise. Its SwapUtils library code is NOT verified and *DIFFERENT* from  main Swap contract (PeckShield).


incident_title: 20220402_InverseFinance_CR
incident_date: 2022-04-02
incident_description:
A professionally executed hack allowed an anonymous actor to manipulate the price of INV and help themself to an exclusive deal from the ETH based lending protocol.


incident_title: 20211123_PloutozFinance_S
incident_date: 2021-11-23
incident_description:
The hack is made possible due to the price oracle manipulation of $DOP  in  @ploutozfinance. Specifically, the hacker leverages the manipulated $DOP as collateral to borrow other assets, including $CAKE, $ETH, $BTCB etc.


incident_title: 20200913_SoftYearn_CS
incident_date: 2020-09-13
incident_description:
Attacker managed to net a profit of $250k from a $200 outlay due to a flaw in a DeFi protocol clone’s rebase code.


incident_title: 20201026_HarvestFinance_CSR
incident_date: 2020-10-26
incident_description:
The attacker exploited an arbitrage and impermanent loss that influences the value of individual assets inside the Y pool of Curve.fi, which is where the funds of Harvest’s vaults were investe.The attacker repeatedly exploited the effects of impermanent loss of USDC and USDT inside the Y pool on Curve.fi. They used the manipulated asset value to deposit funds into the Harvest’s vaults and obtain vault shares for a beneficial price, and later exit the vault at a regular share price generating a profit. 


incident_title: 20210917_MISO_CS
incident_date: 2021-09-17
incident_description:
anonymous contractor with the GH handle AristoK3 injected malicious code into the Miso front end, replacing the auction wallet address with their own and subsequently acquiring 865 Ether (ETH), valued at $3 million. 


incident_title: 20210315_Pancakeswap_S
incident_date: 2021-03-15
incident_description:
Many DeFi protocol websites on BSC (Binance Smart Chain) were attacked by DNS, including Cream Finance and BSC header DEX PancakeSwap. The attacker requested users to submit personal private keys or mnemonics through the website. The relevant project team has passed Twitter Remind users not to visit the website and do not submit information such as private keys. Later PancakeSwap and Cream Finance both stated that they had regained access to DNS.


incident_title: 20220430_SaddleFinance_CRS
incident_date: 2022-04-30
incident_description:
The exploit was possible due to a bug in an old version of the MetaSwapUtils library which doesn’t use a VirturalPrice to calculate the value of the LP token during metapool swaps.The issue had been fixed in the current version, but the swap calculation was still using the old version.


incident_title: 20200418_Uniswap_S
incident_date: 2020-04-18
incident_description:
The attacker exploits the vulnerability to drain the Uniswap liquidity pool of ETH-imBTC (with about 1,278 ETH).By leveraging the tokensToSend hook, the attacker contract is called after receiving ETH (i.e. the exchange ETH balance has decreased) but before the token balance is modified (i.e. the exchange token balance has not decreased). As a consequence, reentering the vulnerable tokenToEthSwapInput will re-calculate the token-ETH exchage price, but this time with less ETH and same amount of tokens in reserves. Thus, the exchange will be buying the attacker tokens, paying in ETH, at a higher price than it should.


incident_title: 20210522_BoggedFinance_S
incident_date: 2021-05-22
incident_description:
Missing sanity check on ransfer address: self-transfer is allowed. This incident was due to a bug in the BOG token contract that is designed to be deflationary by charging 5% of the transferred amount. Specifically, among the 5% charge, 1% is burned and 4% is taken as a fee for staking profit. However, the token contract implementation only charges 1% of the transferred amount but still inflates the 4% as the staking profit. As a result, the attacker can take advantage of flashloans to significantly increase the staking amount and repeatedly perform **self-transfers **to claim the inflated staking profit. After that, the attacker immediately sells the inflated BOG for about $3.6M WBNB.


incident_title: 20220210_BabyMuskCoin_S
incident_date: 2022-02-10
incident_description:
The project #BabyMuskCoin has dropped 99% and appears to be a #rugpull. 1,571 $BNB (~$66K) was dumped and the funds were moved to Tornado cash.


incident_title: 20211121_BadgerDAO_CSR
incident_date: 2021-11-21
incident_description:
This phishing incident that occurred on 2 Dec, 2021 was the result of a maliciously injected snippet provided by Cloudflare Workers.  Cloudflare Workers is an interface to run scripts that operate on and alter web traffic as it flows through Cloudflare proxies. The attacker deployed the worker script via a compromised API key.


incident_title: 20190928_Fusion_S
incident_date: 2019-09-28
incident_description:
Blockchain-based swap wallet platform the Fusion Network has been hacked on September 28, resulting in the theft of $6.4 million (at the time of hack) worth of digital tokens, the company announced.


incident_title: 20220722_THORChain_CSR
incident_date: 2022-07-22
incident_description:
THORChain has suffered a sophisticated attack on the ETH Router, around $8m. The hacker deliberately limited their impact, seemingly a whitehat. Attacker seems to have called `returnVaultAssets` on the ETH router contract `transferOut` executed on ETH Router contract with `REFUND` memo:


incident_title: 20201117_88mph_S
incident_date: 2020-11-17
incident_description:
88mph has a flaw in the deposit, funding, early withdrawal process which ****fails to burn**** the MPH tokens minted to the funder.(Since the hacker put all the tokens back to the MPH-ETH pool and the dev team drained the pool with another bug, there is no loss after the rescue.)


incident_title: 20210527_WildCredit_S
incident_date: 2021-05-27
incident_description:
Wild Credit was exploited  and the hacker took 125k BNT tokens worth ~$650k. The hacker could have taken all of the 10m TVL locked in the system. The exploit happened due to a very basic issue in the smart contracts that I bet most of the followers can detect.


incident_title: 20210621_ImpossibleFinance_CS
incident_date: 2021-06-21
incident_description:
Using a vulnerability in the LP contract, the hacker managed to swap IF into BUSD at about the price 2 times in a row, which is usually “Impossible” because of the slippage. No check on x*y=k.


incident_title: 20211126_Lever_S
incident_date: 2021-11-26
incident_description:
On Nov-26–2021 06:48:42 PM +UTC, a hacker constructed an attack transaction: https://bscscan.com/tx/0xb5365a299c07c81670e52934893793ad7c225a5cf30b641e20b451b2b5815593
First, the Lever attack contract A flashloaned 2,100 BNB from PancakeSwap and deposited 2000 BNB on Lever’s BNB vault.
It then borrowed 1500 BNB from Lever’s BNB vault and transferred it to Lever attack contract B. The Lever attack contract B deposited 1500 BNB and used it to drain 32.78 ETH, 1,068.05 BAKE, 167.25 XVS, 1,042.89DAI, 64,157.79 BUSD, 54,335.19USDT ,2.8806 BTC, 1,930.01CAKE, 463.0078DOT, and 332.9184 WBNB. (The total loss equals $652941.949 at present market price.)


incident_title: 20201011_WLEO_S
incident_date: 2020-10-11
incident_description:
This attack was carried out by an attacker who managed to get a hold of the private key that governed the wLEO minting contract. After investigating the addresses involved, we've found that this particular address was the only one receiving minted WLEO during the attack. It then used the "fake" WLEO that was minted to swap into the Uniswap pool in exchange for ETH.(LEO official)


incident_title: 20201026_MakerDAO_S
incident_date: 2020-10-26
incident_description:
The malicious Web3 applications "phishing dapps" were discovered in a recent study, they pretend to be legitimate applications or services to steal cryptocurrencies. For example, since MakerDAO officially closed the single-mortgage Sai system, such phishing tools have begun to appear, and they pretended to need a new tool to help users migrate from SAI to DAI. For example, a domain name provides a simple interface to start the migration from SAI to the new DAI at a 1:1 ratio, it seems like an official channel. However, the actual transaction to be signed simply sends the SAI to an address owned by the attacker. SAI, which has been traced to more than US$100,000, was transferred to the attacker's account.


incident_title: 20211127_dydx_S
incident_date: 2021-11-27
incident_description:
dYdX released an investigation report on the deposit contract accident on November 27, stating that there has been a serious loophole in the agent smart contract that has been handling deposits to the dYdX exchange since November 24. At around 12:00 UTC on the 27th, dYdX The team performed a white hat hacking operation to save vulnerable user funds, totaling approximately US$2 million. These funds are sent to a non-custodial escrow contract, and only the original owner of these funds can retrieve them. However, when the dYdX team performed the white hat hacking operation, an estimated $211,000 of funds was used by the MEV robot, and the user has now been fully compensated.


incident_title: 20211212_BentFinance_SR
incident_date: 2021-12-12
incident_description:
Bent-Finance-Deployer deploys 0xb45d6c0897721bb6ffa9451c2c80f99b24b573b9 contract containing backdoor line in the last line of upgradeVersion() method


incident_title: 20201128_SushiSwap_S
incident_date: 2020-11-28
incident_description:
The attacker uses SLP and WETH to create a new token pool, uses the SLP1 (WETH/SLP(USDT/WETH) of the new token pool to convert in Sushi Maker, and uses a small amount of SLP to transfer all SLPs in the Sushi Maker contract to the token pool created by himself. All the swap fees of the corresponding transaction pair within a period of time will be collected into the bag. Repeat this process for other trading pairs and continue to make profits


incident_title: 20210125_SushiSwap_S
incident_date: 2021-01-25
incident_description:
The problem was that the transaction fee of the DIGG-WBTC trading pair was taken away by the attacker through special means:The **absence of a bridge** that should have sent a reward to stakers resulted in oversized fees to the hacker.


incident_title: 20210724_THORChain_S
incident_date: 2021-07-24
incident_description:
Hackers airdrop UniH tokens to Ethereum addresses as bait to steal RUNE tokens in users' wallets. Hackers have airdropped UniH tokens with malicious contracts to at least 76,000 Ethereum addresses. Once receiving users sell their newly received UniH tokens (or even just approve the sale) on decentralized trading platforms such as Uniswap, the hackers will They can steal any RUNE tokens they have in their wallets. This is because the RUNE token uses a non-standard token contract called "tx.origin". According to Thorchain’s RUNE token contract code “Beware of phishing contracts that may steal tokens by intercepting tx.origin”, it knows that this type of attack may occur


incident_title: 20220128_FlurryFinance_S
incident_date: 2022-01-28
incident_description:
Around $295,000 has been drained from the vaults of decentralized finance (DeFi) platform Flurry Finance following a hack on its smart contracts. The attack took place on Tuesday (February 22) when a malicious hacker deployed an exploit that enabled the increase of a multiplier influencing the balance of rhoToken, a deposit token used by Flurry Finance for yield aggregation.


incident_title: 20220327_RevestFinance_SR
incident_date: 2022-03-27
incident_description:
On March 27th, 2022, at 1:41 AM UTC, the Revest Protocol suffered an exploit in which roughly $2M worth of tokens (namely BLOCKS, ECO, and RENA) were stolen from our Ethereum-based token vault. 


incident_title: 20210316_IronFinance_CS
incident_date: 2021-03-16
incident_description:
The Faas upgrade changes the reward rate from gwei to a normal integer, and the team was unware of this. This caused the pools' rewards inflated by 10^18 times.


incident_title: 20210305_PaidNetwork_CR
incident_date: 2021-03-05
incident_description:
The attacker used a compromised private key to the original contract deployer to leverage the upgrade function of the smart contract. The attacker then proceeded to ‘upgrade’ to a new smart contract which had the ability to burn and re-mint tokens.


incident_title: 20200312_MakerDAO_S
incident_date: 2020-03-12
incident_description:
In mid-March, mempools got congested with useless transactions on purpose, as part of a plan to win zero-bid auctions for ETH on MakerDAO under just these conditions.Falling ETH prices triggered auctions of collateral on MakerDAO. Because the mempools were clogged, bidders could not get bids on those auctions through in many cases, allowing attackers to win ETH collateral with bids worth $0.


incident_title: 20200811_NEXE_S
incident_date: 2020-08-11
incident_description:
Two small-scale token projects, NUGS and C, appeared to have committed "travel fraud" shortly after being launched on Uniswap. The NUGS project blamed this move on a "smart contract vulnerability". On its official telegram channel, NUGS stated that its smart contract is now "unfixable." Another project, NEXE, is also suspected to have gone, and the social media account of this project has been deleted.


incident_title: 20210627_SharedStake_S
incident_date: 2021-06-27
incident_description:
Developer ‘rug pulls’  Decentralized Ethereum 2.0 staking protocol SharedStake, SGT token falls 95%. SharedStake has a developer on the loose that used the admin key and exploited the protocol’s governance token SGT (coinmarketcap). The Ethereum 2.0 staking solution SharedStake released an attacked report, stating that the reason the SharedStake token was minted before the official launch was due to the use of **vulnerabilities in time-locked contracts** (that is, smart contracts that perform certain operations at a fixed time) by internal personnel. The vulnerability was submitted to the team by the white hat Lucash-dev on April 26. Because a team member had permission to view the vulnerability, he used the vulnerability to cast a value of about 50 on the main network four times on June 19 and 23. Ten thousand USD tokens were sold and mortgaged after the official launch. Although there is not enough evidence, the core members of SharedStake suspect that it was the work of a new team member. SharedStake stated that it is currently fixing the loopholes and will manage multi-signature agreement funds in the future.(slowmist)


incident_title: 20210227_Furucombo_CSR
incident_date: 2021-02-27
incident_description:
Evil contract exploit: the attacker made the Furucombo proxy contract think that Aave V2 had a new implementation.The incident was due to a flaw of inappropriate trust in the protocol, which is exploited to cascadingly misuse the allowed spending of this protocol on its users.


incident_title: 20210527_JulSwap_S
incident_date: 2021-05-27
incident_description:
Another BSC project, JulSwap, was hacked of a similar nature to burgerswap, which caused a 95 percent price crash. (No check on x*y=k.)
However, its founder has confirmed that there has been no exploit or hack at the protocol level (https://coinmarketcap.com/zh/headlines/news/burgerswap-flash-loan-attack-binance-smart-chain-bsc-sweeps-7-million-losses/).
It's irresponsible to call this ""NO hack or exploit"" and not do anything to fix it. (@Mudit__Gupta https://twitter.com/Mudit__Gupta/status/1398179149102026754)


incident_title: 20210616_Alchemix_CSR
incident_date: 2021-06-16
incident_description:
At roughly 12:30 PM UTC some users of the Alchemix alETH vault discovered they had no outstanding debt even though they previously borrowed alETH at a 4:1 collateral ratio. In addition to this, the debt ceiling of almost 2,000 ETH was freed up to mint new alETH again. Nobody lost any funds but some users actually gained. ""alEth bug on Alchemix
People who deposited Eth and took a loan in alEth could take their Eth deposit without paying loan.@Nomaticcap https://twitter.com/Nomaticcap/status/1405172780606410753""


incident_title: 20220127_Qubit_CSR
incident_date: 2022-01-27
incident_description:
At 9:34PM UTC on January 27th, 2022, an attacker began their exploit of Qubit Finance’s Ethereum-BSC bridge. This exploit ended up netting them 77,162 qXETH ($185 million), which they then used to borrow and convert 15,688 wETH ($37.6 million), 767 BTC-B ($28.5 million), approximately $9.5 million in various stablecoins, and ~$5 million in CAKE, BUNNY, and MDX.At $80 million TVL (Total Value Lost), this is by far the largest exploit of 2022 to date. One of the root causes of the vulnerability was the fact that tokenAddress.safeTransferFrom() does not revert when the tokenAddress is the zero (null) address (0x0…000).


incident_title: 20201117_OriginDollar_CSR
incident_date: 2020-11-17
incident_description:
The origin protocol was attacked by exploiting its flawed handling of the mint logic in its VaultCore smart contract.This incident was due to a bug in the protocol  (1) without validating the transferred-in assets and (2) without enforcing reentrancy protection on the mint logic. The exploitation leads to a greatly inflated totalSupply of the rebasing token, i.e., OUSD. The attacker then makes use of the inflation to redeem and drain about $7.7M of assets from the OUSD vault. This hack is initialized from a malicious ERC20-like contract (located at 0x47c3). This malicious contract implements a hook that will be invoked whenever the transferFrom() (function signature: 0x23b872dd) is being called.


incident_title: 20210710_Chainswap_CSR
incident_date: 2021-07-10
incident_description:
On July 11, 2021, the cross-chain bridge project Chainswap was exploited, which resulted in a total loss of 20 assets on the bridge with a combined value of $4 million.


incident_title: 20201106_CheeseBank_S
incident_date: 2020-11-06
incident_description:
This particular hack drains $3.3 million of USDC/USDT/DAI from Cheese Bank by exploiting a bug in its way to measure asset price from an AMM-based oracle.


incident_title: 20210903_DAOMaker_CS
incident_date: 2021-09-03
incident_description:
On 3rd of September 2021, around 10:00 PM UTC, DAO Maker, a decentralized finance platform on the Ethereum blockchain that enables startups to raise funds, was hacked for almost $4 million (although the true realized cost to DAO Maker is far greater).A collection of altcoins were stolen; DeRace Token (DERC), Capsule Coin (CAPS) Showcase (SHO) and Coinspaid (CPD). DAOMaker’s init() function was left vulnerable, allowing the attacker to reinitialise 4 token contracts with malicious data. Then, the emergencyExit() function was used to withdraw the funds from each.


incident_title: 20220411_CFToken_S
incident_date: 2022-04-11
incident_description:
The $CF token contract is fundamentally flawed by allowing anyone to drain others' $CF balance. So far, the loss is about ~$1.9M and the pancakeswap $CF - $USDT pair is already affected.


incident_title: 20220312_Paraluni_S
incident_date: 2022-03-12
incident_description:
On March 13, 2022, the SlowMist intelligence zone received news that the metaverse project Paraluni was the victim of a $1.7 million hack. The depositByAddLiquidity function within the MasterChef contract does not check whether the LP token constructed by the incoming token array parameter _tokens corresponds to the specified _pid parameter and is consistent with the LP token (USDT-BUSD LP) in the pool.There is also no reentrancy restriction when adding liquidity calculations, leading to the use of malicious contracts to conduct reentrancy attacks.


incident_title: 20210919_pNetwork_CS
incident_date: 2021-09-19
incident_description:
On September 19th, 2021 at 5:20pm UTC time, the pNetwork system was attacked by a hacker who performed the offensive against multiple pTokens bridges. However, the exploit was only successful on the pBTC-on-BSC cross-chain bridge, which bridge was exploited and 277 BTC, stolen from the pBTC-on-BSC collateral. These smart contracts created a series of event logs: one of those being a legit peg-out request, while the others were faulty peg-out requests emitted by the attacker’s smart contracts rather than from the pToken ones.Due to a bug in the section of the Rust code in charge of extracting these log events, both the legitimate and the faulty logs were extracted and erroneously processed.


incident_title: 20201228_CoverProtocol_CSR
incident_date: 2020-12-28
incident_description:
This incident was due to a business bug (memory/Storage misuse) in the protocol that mis-calculates the reward amount for staking users. 9.4m taken, 3.2m recovered and $6.2m lost. The bug that caused this attack is present on line 118 of the Blacksmith.sol smart contract. The contract caches the pool data in memory to save some gas, updates the pool data in storage but forgets to update the cached data. The outdated cached data is later used in calculations and that enables the hack.


incident_title: 20211027_BXH_S
incident_date: 2021-10-27
incident_description:
A hack on Boy X Highspeed (BXH), a decentralized cross-chain exchange, that drained $139 million of funds was probably the result of a leaked administrator key, and possibly an inside job.


incident_title: 20211020_PancakeHunny_CSR
incident_date: 2021-10-20
incident_description:
The hack is made possible due to a profit inflation bug, which converts the relatively small amount of harvested $ALPACA to large amount of $TUSD for staking. These converted TUSDs are then counted as profit, now inflated to mint large amount of $HUNNY!


incident_title: 20210508_RariCapital_CSR
incident_date: 2021-05-08
incident_description:
Rari Capital’s Ethereum Pool contract calculates the ibETH/ETH exchange rate by using the ibETH.totalETH()/ibETH.totalSupply() calculation from the ibETH contract, which can lead to incorrect assumption (e.g. during ibETH.work(), where debt value gets updated towards the very end).ibETH.totalETH()` is vulnerable to manipulation inside the `ibETH.work` function, and a user of `ibETH.work` can call any contract it wants to inside `ibETH.work`, including the Rari Capital Ethereum Pool deposit and withdrawal functions. Unfortunately, the Rari Capital contributors were not aware that `ibETH.totalETH()` could be manipulated for the duration of these external calls from `ibETH.work`  (external payable)


incident_title: 20210408_UraniumFinance_S
incident_date: 2021-04-08
incident_description:
An exploiter was able to constantly grab the contents of the RADS pool and all of the RADS/sRADS rewards and sell them for $1.3Mil worth of BUSD and BNB. This drastically dumped the price of RADS and the exploiter then transferred the BUSD and BNB to his wallet.


incident_title: 20210208_GrowthDefi_CR
incident_date: 2021-02-08
incident_description:
By forcing the staker contract to accept a liquidity pair containing a fake token, the attacker was able to remove $1.3 million in liquidity. The attacker created a fake token called AXZ and supplied rAXZZ/GRO liquidity. He then staked it in the contract and pulled out the other pair.


incident_title: 20210625_xWinFinance_S
incident_date: 2021-06-25
incident_description:
xWin Finance was exploited and the attacker gained about $270k. This incident was due to an invalid slippage control in the protocol, which is exploited in a flashloan to obtain extra xWin rewards. This incident. was due to a bug in the internal _swapBNBToTokens() function of xWinFund contract which implements a price slippage control. However, the logic of slippage control is invalid. The hacker made use of this bug and gained rewards (in terms of 303,998.86 xWin tokens) from the contract to swap for BNB (peckshield).


incident_title: 20210219_F2Pool_S
incident_date: 2021-02-19
incident_description:
F2Pool was attacked by DDos, and some addresses experienced short-term failures, which have been restored.


incident_title: 20210507_ValueDeFi_SR
incident_date: 2021-05-07
incident_description:
Incorrect weighted constant product invariant calculation.The incident was due to the improper use of a complex exponentiation power() function behind the calculation and enforcement of the weighted constant product invariant. 


incident_title: 20220323_RoninNetwork_SC
incident_date: 2022-03-23
incident_description:
There has been a security breach on the Ronin Network. Earlier today, we discovered that on March 23rd, Sky Mavis’s Ronin validator nodes and Axie DAO validator nodes were compromised resulting in 173,600 Ethereum and 25.5M USDC drained from the Ronin bridge in two transactions


incident_title: 20220412_ElephantMoney_CRS
incident_date: 2022-04-12
incident_description:
Elephant Money, a stable coin platform that uses the TRUNK token became a victim of the flash loan attack, which manipulated a token price oracle leading to a loss of $22.2 million


incident_title: 20210516_BearnFi_CSR
incident_date: 2021-05-16
incident_description:
This incident was due to the mis-matched asset denomination implicitly assumed by BvaultsBank and its BvaultsStrategy strategy. Specifically, the BvaultsBank's withdraw logic assumes the withdrawn amount is denominated in BUSD while the BvaultsStrategy's withdraw logic assumes the withdrawn amount is denominated in ibBUSD. Note that ibBUSD is an interest-bearing token and is more expensive than BUSD. As a result, the withdraw request of 100 BUSD effectively leads to the withdraw of 100 ibBUSD. The exploitation of the issue leads to about $11M funds drained from the BvaultsBank contract.


incident_title: 20210703_Chainswap_S
incident_date: 2021-07-03
incident_description:
The cross-chain asset bridge Chainswap announced the details of the hacking incident today, saying that at 04:30 AM UTC on July 2nd, they noticed an abnormality on the cross-chain bridge. Some users reported that their tokens were actively removed from wallets interacting with ChainSwap. After it was taken out, the ChainSwap team immediately froze the cross-chain bridge, shut down all nodes, and deployed the fix within 30 minutes. The team of the affected project received an alert. According to the announcement, the stolen assets include 32237576.17 TSHP, 80052.82027 CORRA, 643405.7157 BLANK, 2922720 RAI, 19392.27712 ROOM, 4820309.98 DEXT, 210,108.22 UMB, 55476328.8 FAIR. 


incident_title: 20210524_AutoSharkFinance_CSR
incident_date: 2021-05-24
incident_description:
On May 24, 2021, 09:41:49 PM +UTC, less than 5 days after the bunny hack. A copycat hacker used 100K BNB of flash loan and minted 135M of SHARK token from Autoshark, a copycat of Bunny.


incident_title: 20200215_bZx_CS
incident_date: 2020-02-15
incident_description:
There are quite a few misunderstandings circulating around about the nature of this particular hack. We emphasize that this is not an oracle attack. Instead, it is a clever arbitrage execution, which did exploit a bug in bZx smart contract implementation to allow for the leakage of supposedly-locked bZx funds to Uniswap and further absorb the leaked funds into a Compound position


incident_title: 20220104_ArbixFinance_RS
incident_date: 2022-01-04
incident_description:
~$10 million taken, and no advanced attack techniques in sight.Arbix Finance labelled themselves as an arbitrage-focused project on BSC, in which users could deposit into single-asset vaults in order “to gain optimal yield with low risk”.


incident_title: 20201102_AxionNetwork_S
incident_date: 2020-11-02
incident_description:
The hacker managed to mint around ~80 billion AXN tokens by utilizing the ***unstake function*** of the Axion Staking contract.The hacker proceeded to then dump the tokens on the AXN Uniswap exchange for Ether, repeating this process until the Uniswap exchange was drained and the token price was driven to 0.


incident_title: 20201121_PickleFinance_CSR
incident_date: 2020-11-21
incident_description:
Taking advantage of multiple flaws in the system, including issues with the Jar swap and Jar convert logic, the attacker use fake contract addresses of _fromJar and _toJar when calling the swapExactJarForJar function in the Controller contract, and exchanged fake coins for the real DAI in the contrac.


incident_title: 20200926_KuCoin_RS
incident_date: 2020-09-26
incident_description:
KuCoin disclosed today a mega hack. In a statement posted on its website, the company confirmed that a threat actor breached its systems and emptied its hot wallets of all funds.


incident_title: 20220214_TitanoFinance_S
incident_date: 2022-02-14
incident_description:
The code used to create Titano PLAY, however, was based on pre-existing code that had been employed successfully in other projects for years. Since the code was preexisting and already working, we hired and contracted a developer to assist with implementing it into Titano. This contractor had been recommended to us and was fully public on a well known freelancing website. 
The problem occurred when we trusted the contractor to deploy the PLAY contract. Despite transferring ownership back to us after deployment it was the same deployer wallet that would allow for the hack that stole all the Titano from our PLAY protocol two days ago.


incident_title: 20220425_WienerDoge_S
incident_date: 2022-04-25
incident_description:
The hacker flashloaned 2,900 BNB, swapped 5,974,259,851,654 WDOGE tokens from the WDOGE and BNB transaction pairs, and then retransferred 4,979,446,261,701 tokens into the transaction pairs.
The hacker then called the skim function to re-withdraw the excess WDOGE tokens from the transaction pair, and due to the deflationary nature of the tokens, 199,177,850,468 tokens are burned off at the same time during the transfer of the transaction pair to the attack address.
At this point the k-value of the transaction pair had been destroyed, and the hacker used the remaining WDOGE tokens to successfully swap out 2,978 BNBs within the transaction pair and transferred the profited 78 $BNBs to the profited address.


incident_title: 20210228_Armor_S
incident_date: 2021-02-28
incident_description:
DeFi Insurance Agreement The Armor team claimed that some team members were scammed by OTC and were defrauded of 1.2 million ARMOR tokens. The scammers have already dumped all tokens for a profit of 600 ETH (approximately US$850,000). The Armor team disclosed that the scammers pretended to be strategic investors on social media, falsely claiming to purchase tokens from the team through OTC, defrauded 1.2 million ARMOR tokens in OTC transactions, and then sold them. According to the Armor team, "No hacking, the project is still safe."


incident_title: 20201114_ValueDeFi_CSR
incident_date: 2020-11-14
incident_description:
Value DeFi was exploited to drain $7.4 million of DAI from its pooled MultiStablesVault. The incident was due to a bug in the way to measure asset price from an AMM-based oracle.


incident_title: 20211221_VisorFinance_CSR
incident_date: 2021-12-21
incident_description:
On December 21st 2021 02:29:11 PM UTC a malicious contract drained Visor Finance’s staking contract of 8,812,958 VISR tokens. The attack was made possible by implementing the IVisor delegateTransferERC20 interface and calling the staking contract’s withdraw function with the desired VISR amount. Dependence on arbitrary IVisor delegateTransferERC20 implementation by caller allowed for the attack to take place. "Due to a vulnerable require() check in the vVISR Rewards Contract’s deposit() function, the hacker was able to mint unlimited shares using their own contract.
As long as the hacker passes their own contract as “from” and the contract has an Owner() method of msg.sender, then they can mint as many shares as they want to any address using vvisr.mint()."


incident_title: 20220126_InfinityToken_S
incident_date: 2022-01-26
incident_description:
#RugPull PeckShield has detected that  $InfinityToken(https://bscscan.com/token/0x52e4339b4b9ff254738d6e971e83440f60dc029c) rugged, more than 1,390 WBNB! #BSC


incident_title: 20210629_THORChain_CS
incident_date: 2021-06-29
incident_description:
$140k in funds were taken by a targeted exploit on a logic error in the ETH-Bifrost.The bug was that all non-ETH assets were being initialised with common.ETHAsset (ETH), but if the symbol returned “ETH”, it would skip. This means that it was being reported as ETH.ETH and not ETH.ETH-0xaddress.


incident_title: 20201214_DeTradeFund_S
incident_date: 2020-12-14
incident_description:
According to reports, DeTrade Fund was the biggest scam on Friday, the platform allowing any user to profit by putting money into its arbitrage system and defrauding more than 1,400 ETH raised in a pre-sale.


incident_title: 20211123_OlympusDAO_S
incident_date: 2021-11-23
incident_description:
One bond is for liquidity tokens (LP) for the OHM/DAI pool on SushiSwap. Olympus DAO mistakenly believed they had shut down this bond but didn't actually do so.
Somebody used this bond to sell $50,000 of OHM/DAI LP tokens for 1,697 OHM, worth $1.43 million. Instead, they should have received only around $52,000 to $55,000 of OHM. The OHM tokens they received will be distributed over five days


incident_title: 20220108_LCX_RS
incident_date: 2022-01-08
incident_description:
At roughly 11:23 PM CET on January 9th, LCX’s Technology team detected unauthorized access of one crypto wallet at the LCX platform.


incident_title: 20210404_ForceDAO_CS
incident_date: 2021-04-04
incident_description:
xforce vault didn't check the return value on transferFrom().They use the years old MiniMeToken contract which doesn't revert but returns false when you transferFrom without approval or not enough funds. So that's problematic per se. Should've wrapped it in a safeTransferFrom.


incident_title: 20221101_SQUID_S
incident_date: 2022-11-01
incident_description:
Squid Game  is suspected of running off or being attacked, with an estimated loss of 12 million USDT. 
all the tokens in the current Pancake pledge pool have been transferred to the address: 0x71D934Aa2119CA3995F702f075d540f7A6b0f728 through two transactions. The hash value of one of the transactions on the BSC is: 0xf7c9d0e5a81999f9e06fe78df7ce41da112d8bd4f2da7b16cfdbbe46c92cb6af. The address for initiating the token withdrawal transaction is 0x614826D885FF973324a5C3f43369d7C413a88aea. In addition, traders from the address 0x1f5eabba9c56bca4a7828969b79bc87051125b31 sold SQUID tokens to transfer the BNB in ​​the trading pair in Pancake to: 0x71D934Aa2119CA3995F702f075d540f7A6b0f728.


incident_title: 20220118_Multichain_S
incident_date: 2022-01-18
incident_description:
The cross-chain bridge Multichain said that an important vulnerability affecting six tokens of WETH, PERI, OMT, WBNB, MATIC, and AVAX was officially discovered. Now the vulnerability has been successfully repaired, and all users' assets are safe and cross-chain. Transactions will not be affected. However, if the user has authorized these six assets, he needs to log in as soon as possible to revoke the authorization, otherwise the assets may be at risk. According to the official announcement on the 19th, because some users did not cancel the authorization in time, the stolen funds were about 445 WETH, worth about 1.43 million US dollars.


incident_title: 20210529_BeltFinance_CSR
incident_date: 2021-05-29
incident_description:
Belt Finance on the Binance Smart Chain (BSC) suffered a lightning loan attack and lost US$6.2 million. The attacker used flash loans to obtain more than 6.2 million US dollars of funds from the Belt Finance agreement through 8 transactions, and has converted most of the funds into anyETH and withdrawn to Ethereum.  The attack happened with two vectors:  Ellipsis LP price manipulation and large deposits/withdrawals from other beltBUSD strategies.  
The attack originated from the attacker’s repeated buying and selling of BUSD, and the use of loopholes in the calculation of the balance of the bEllipsisBUSD strategy to manipulate the price of beltBUSD for profit. (peckshield)


incident_title: 20210812_PineconeFinance_S
incident_date: 2021-08-12
incident_description:
On August 19, the vault of Pinecone Finance, a revenue aggregation project on the BSC, was hacked and lost approximately 3.5 million PCT tokens (market value of approximately US$200,000). The vulnerability of this attack is that the tokens used in the transfer process are depleted, and the contract does not handle this depletion properly, which leads to the vulnerability and the hacker attack.


incident_title: 20210505_ValueDeFi_SR
incident_date: 2021-05-05
incident_description:
On May 5th 2021, 3:22 AM UTC, the exploiter re-initialized the pool and set the operator role to himself and _stakeToken to HACKEDMONEY.


incident_title: 20210812_DAOMaker_CS
incident_date: 2021-08-12
incident_description:
The Neko Experimental Network of Maze Protocol was attacked at Aug-11–2021 09:39:24 PM +UTC. The attackers exploited a leak in the MainPool contract and borrowed funds directly to their own addresses. The parameter sent into the borrow method is onBehalfOf, which is the account who can borrow, while on the frontend, it is msg.sender that calls onBehalfOf in the borrow method. That leads to the severe vulnerability:If an evil account sends the onBehalfOf address to the user address that has collateral deposited in the Funding Pools with borrow credit remaining, the evil account is able to borrow funds under the name of the user. The consequence is debtToken mint to the onBehalfOf address, but fToken transferUnderlyingTo is towards the msg.sender.


incident_title: 20210713_DeFiPie_S
incident_date: 2021-07-13
incident_description:
The attacker was able to withdraw almost all available liquidity from the protocol in ETH and BSC networks. Since the function doTransferOut is before the update of the account state, therefore, upon re-entry, the hacker was able to borrow for an amount exceeding the collateral.


incident_title: 20210610_EvoDefi_S
incident_date: 2021-06-10
incident_description:
EvoDefi, the project revenue farm on the BSC chain, was attacked, and the price of its token GEN dropped from US2.1/piecetoUS0.9/piece, a short-term drop of 57%. Loss of 455,576.85 GEN worth approximately USD 1 million.


incident_title: 20210714_ApeRocket_S
incident_date: 2021-07-14
incident_description:
At around 4:30 AM UTC on July 14, ApeRocket’s CAKE vault was exploited and drained $260K (883 BNB) out of the SPACE token LP on ApeSwap.


incident_title: 20220127_Wegrocoin_S
incident_date: 2022-01-27
incident_description:
PeckShieldAlert tweeted that it detected a rug pull on the BSC project Wegrocoin (WEGRO). According to PeckShield, "the deployer drained more than 1,000 BNB", which is equivalent to about US$365,761 at current prices.


incident_title: 20200618_Bancor_S
incident_date: 2020-06-18
incident_description:
Due to the unverified safeTransferFrom () function in the new Bancor network contract, user funds are about to be depleted. The Bancor team stated: 1. A security vulnerability was discovered in the new Bancor Network v0.6 contract released two days ago; 2. After the vulnerability was discovered, the team conducted a white hat attack to transfer funds to a secure address; 3. The audit of the smart contract has been completed.But there are still $135,229 preemptively traded by two unknown arbitrage robots.


incident_title: 20210304_MeerkatFinance_CSR
incident_date: 2021-03-04
incident_description:
After just one day of operation, Meerkat Finance was rug pulled for 13 million BUSD and about 73,000 BNB, currently totalling around $31m.


incident_title: 20220106_Stobox_S
incident_date: 2022-01-06
incident_description:
StoboxToken’s deployer address has been hacked, according to StoboxCompany. All reserve money has been stolen or liquidated because the deployer addresses of ETH and BSC are the same. Users are urged to halt purchasing and selling, and the STBU snapshot will be restored to the last transaction before the hack.


incident_title: 20210929_Compound_CSR
incident_date: 2021-09-29
incident_description:
A community led (but professionally checked) proposal 62 contained a bug which allowed for the distribution of ~$80M in excess COMP rewards. Smart contracts are unforgiving of the tiniest errors...COMP bug is a tragic case of ">" instead of ">=" (in two code locations).


incident_title: 20211110_Curve_S
incident_date: 2021-11-10
incident_description:
Mochi used bribes in their own token (MOCHI) to vote in a gauge receiving CRV
Mochi incentivised votes to its gauge via Convex until the factory pool reached $100m liquidity
Mochi minted a huge amount of tokens to themselves 108, Mochi has no minting cap or tokenomics
Deposit those tokens onto the MOCHI which has a custom price oracle set by the Mochi team 69 (meaning the Mochi team could mint as many tokens as they wanted if there was enough liquidity to trade it for stables that aren’t backed by air) and 90% LTV and mint $46m USDM
Swap those USDM to DAI on Curve 48
Use those DAI to purchase Ethereum and ultimately buy 1.05m CVX 41
At that point, several people aware of the situation including Andre Cronje and myself tried to warn Mochi against locking those CVX as they would have been in a position to unfold their position and make LPs of that pool whole if the acquired CVX had remained liquid.
Mochi eventually locked the CVX 111


incident_title: 20211029_AutoSharkFinance_S
incident_date: 2021-10-29
incident_description:
On Oct-29–2021 08:25:03 AM +UTC, an attacker manipulated the NOVA-BNB pool of ShibaNOVA by swapping back and forth many times. The balance of NOVA in that pool will get to near 0 after a swap of 50 times, which caused the price of NOVA in that pool to be sky-high.
The price of $JAWS was also artificially increased so that the attacker can get more back from the performance fee (artificial WBNB profit) that is automatically being used for adding liquidity.
In addition, the attacker also utilized the use of 5 NFTs to boost the $JAWS rewards in the pool.


incident_title: 20210204_YearnFinance_CSR
incident_date: 2021-02-04
incident_description:
The vault was attacked using 9 flash loans. $11 million was lost from the vault, $2.7m of which went to the attacker, $3.5m went to Curve liquidity providers, $3.5m went to Curve stakers, and $1.4m was paid in Aave v2 fees.


incident_title: 20210715_THORChain_CSR
incident_date: 2021-07-15
incident_description:
The bug is in the ETH Bifrost, and not the router.
The attacker wrapped the router with their own contract, which they called with a msg.value of 200, but their own contract called into the router with a call value of 0 and a deposit amount of 0.
The bifrost ultimately read the msg.value, with is 200, and not the final deposit amount, which was 0.


incident_title: 20220430_FeiProtocol_CSR
incident_date: 2022-04-30
incident_description:
This attack was due to a design flaw in the FeiProtocl that failed to follow the check-effect-interaction pattern and thus allow the attacker to make a reentrant call before the borrow records are updated. The attacker is able to make a reentrant call in the “fallback()” function to exitMarket()


incident_title: 20210803_PopsicleFinance_CSR
incident_date: 2021-08-03
incident_description:
Hacker executed a transaction that managed to drain 85% of the Sorbetto Fragola (UniswapV3 Optimizer) pools. The Popsicle Finance attacker exploited this vulnerability to trick the Sorbetto Fragola liquidity pool into believing that the fees owed to them were equal to the total TVL of the entire pool.  As a result, they were able to extract all of the $20.7 million in tokens currently in the pool.


incident_title: 20200628_Balancer_CS
incident_date: 2020-06-28
incident_description:
 Balancer was attacked by exploiting its flawed handling of ERC20 deflationary tokens. Technically, the main logic behind the incident is the incompatibility between Balancer and deflationary tokens, which is then misused by the attacker to create skewed STA/STONK pools states and make profits from that.


incident_title: 20210710_Anyswap_SR
incident_date: 2021-07-10
incident_description:
The root of the exploit lay in the prototype V3 Router’s use of ECDSA, the algorithm securing its MPC wallet by generating private keys.

The key here is that every k value calculated in the algorithm should be based on a different, random number for each signature. If two or more transactions contain a repeated k value, then the private key can be back-calculated.


incident_title: 20210714_BondlyFinance_CSR
incident_date: 2021-07-14
incident_description:
Bondly Finance fell victim to an attack from a malicious actor (Attacker) leading to the transfer of 373,088,023 $BONDLY tokens from the Bondly Staking Rewards contract, 200,460,000 of which were used to mint zenBONDLY in a sophisticated attack on the MANTRA DAO ZENTEREST platform. The attacker gained access to a password account belonging to Brandon Smith, CEO of Bondly.  


incident_title: 20220114_FloatProtocol_S
incident_date: 2022-01-14
incident_description:
The attacker brought in >47 ETH via Tornado Cash and deployed an orchestrating contract. Through the contract they swapped 47 ETH -> 129,447 USDC -> 77.5k FLOAT. This brought the vast majority of FLOAT out of the pool and it dramatically increased the price within the FLOAT/USDC pool. The attacker then waited for 2-7 minutes for the time-weighted oracles to shift the price.At this point, they were then able to deposit FLOAT into Rari Fuse at a vastly increased rate and borrow other assets, before selling the FLOAT back into the Uniswap V3 pool to return the price. According to the postmortem, the orchestrating contract still contains 250k USDC and 5 FLOAT. 


incident_title: 20210312_TSD_S
incident_date: 2021-03-12
incident_description:
No security vulnerabilities were exploited in the TSD smart contract or dApps. Through an understanding of the DAO mechanism, the attacked continued to purchase TSD at a low price and leveraged the mechanism by which token holders could no longer vote on proposals after they unbonded their tokens. Taking into consideration the project owner has a very low proportion of voting rights, the attacker took control of the governance surrounding proposal No. 2 with absolute advantage, thereby ensuring that the malicious proposal was passed.


incident_title: 20210501_Spartan_CSR
incident_date: 2021-05-01
incident_description:
The attacker used multiple transactions to bypass slippage protections*** within the contract and was able to take advantage of a flawed liquidity share calculation in the smart contract code.  The calculation checked the current balance (which the attacker inflated) rather than the cached balance.  The difference between these two values is what allowed the attacker to extract extra tokens during each round of the attack.
The vulnerability stems from the fact that the liquidity share calculation calcLiquidityShare() is querying the current balance which can then be inflated for manipulation. A correct calculation needs to make use of cached balance in baseAmountPooled/tokenAmountPooled. (not using cache). @peckshield


incident_title: 20210428_UraniumFinance_CSR
incident_date: 2021-04-28
incident_description:
$57,000,000 was taken due to a simple math bug introduced to the UraniumPair contracts which had been forked from the Uniswap v2 code.


incident_title: 20210829_xToken_SR
incident_date: 2021-08-29
incident_description:
~$4.5 million stolen from their xSNX contract.Three months ago this team lost $24 million - in the same token, to the same attack technique. An erroneous require statement allowed the function to be publicly callable. require(sender==address(this) was used when xToken should have used require(msg.sender==soloMarginAddress)


incident_title: 20180710_Bancor_S
incident_date: 2018-07-10
incident_description:
The Bancor platform theft was related to the BancorConverter contract, and the attacker (hacker/mole) is very likely to get the private key of the 0x009bb5e9fcf28e5e601b7d0e9e821da6365d0a9c.


incident_title: 20210812_NekoNetwork_S
incident_date: 2021-08-12
incident_description:
The Neko Experimental Network of Maze Protocol was attacked at Aug-11–2021 09:39:24 PM +UTC. The attackers exploited a leak in the MainPool contract and borrowed funds directly to their own addresses.


incident_title: 20201217_WarpFinance_CSR
incident_date: 2020-12-17
incident_description:
The root cause of this incident was the use of AMM-based oracle (Uniswap), which allowed the attacker to manipulate the price of UniswapV2 pair (WETH-DAI) LP token.


incident_title: 20211027_CreamFinance_CSR
incident_date: 2021-10-27
incident_description:
The hacker was able to take advantage of a pricing vulnerability by repeatedly lending and borrowing flash-loaned funds across two addresses.Next, after accumulating yUSDVault-collateralised crYUSD, the price of the underlying yUSDVault token was manipulated in order to effectively double the value of the collateral owned by the attacker.Finally, using the now overvalued collateral, the attacker drained CREAM’s lending vaults of as many assets as possible.


incident_title: 20200804_Opyn_CS
incident_date: 2020-08-04
incident_description:
This hack was done by calling exercise() with more than two vaults with ETH as the underlying assets. Since the implementation treats the same batch of ETH received as multiple batches of ETH receptions, the hacker re-uses that batch of ETH to retrieve the collateral USDC and make profits.


incident_title: 20210810_PolyNetwork_CSR
incident_date: 2021-08-10
incident_description:
Poly Network was attacked by anonymous white hat hacker or hackers, causing over $610 million in digital crypto assets at the price of that date to be transferred to hacker-controlled addresses. Eventually, all assets were returned to Poly Network over the next 15 days. This was the largest security incident in DeFi's history in terms of the mark-to-market value of stolen assets at the price of that date. "The hackers exploited a ""vulnerability between contract calls"" 
""Poly has a contract called the ""EthCrossChainManager"". It's a privileged contract that has the right to trigger messages from another chain. It's a standard thing for cross-chain projects.It has a function named verifyHeaderAndExecuteTx that anyone can call to execute a cross-chain transaction.It (1) verifies that the block header is correct by checking signatures (seems the other chain was a poa sidechain or) and then (2) checks that the transaction was included within that block with a Merkle proof. Here's the code.
One of the last things the function does is call executeCrossChainTx, which makes the call to the target contract. This is where the critical flaw sits. Poly checks that the target is a contract, but they forgot to prevent users from calling a very important target... the EthCrossChainData contract By sending this cross-chain message, the user could trick the EthCrossChainManager into calling the EthCrossChainData contract, passing the onlyOwner check. Now the user just had to craft the right data to be able to trigger the function that changes the public keys…

"	"The hackers exploited a ""vulnerability between contract calls"" 
""Poly has a contract called the ""EthCrossChainManager"". It's a privileged contract that has the right to trigger messages from another chain. It's a standard thing for cross-chain projects.It has a function named verifyHeaderAndExecuteTx that anyone can call to execute a cross-chain transaction.It (1) verifies that the block header is correct by checking signatures (seems the other chain was a poa sidechain or) and then (2) checks that the transaction was included within that block with a Merkle proof. Here's the code.
One of the last things the function does is call executeCrossChainTx, which makes the call to the target contract. This is where the critical flaw sits. Poly checks that the target is a contract, but they forgot to prevent users from calling a very important target... the EthCrossChainData contract By sending this cross-chain message, the user could trick the EthCrossChainManager into calling the EthCrossChainData contract, passing the onlyOwner check. Now the user just had to craft the right data to be able to trigger the function that changes the public keys…

"


incident_title: 20210526_MerlinLab_CSR
incident_date: 2021-05-26
incident_description:
Merlin Lab, (another fork of PancakeBunny), was attacked in a similar fashion to the Bunny and the Autoshark hack. Attack vector:  {LINK-BNB Vault}


incident_title: 20210804_WaultFinance_S
incident_date: 2021-08-04
incident_description:
Hackers use flash loans to buy a large amount of WEX at low prices, then pledge USDT to WUSDMaster to raise the price of WEX, and finally sell them to make a profit. Obviously, when a large number of pledge transactions occur, the WEX in the trading pair will drop significantly, and its value will rise rapidly. At this time, hackers can make huge profits by selling WEX.


incident_title: 20211231_VesperFinance_S
incident_date: 2021-12-31
incident_description:
On December 31, the official report, Vesper Finance stated that the №23 lending pool Vesper Lend beta launched on the interest rate agreement Fuse was once again under attack. The attacker manipulated an oracle and exhausted approximately $1 million in the Beta test lending pool of DAI, ETH, WBTC, and USDC. 


incident_title: 20200623_DMM_S
incident_date: 2020-06-23
incident_description:
DMM Twitter said that during $DMG public sale today, its telegram was unfortunately brigaded by malicious actors who impersonated the DMM Foundation with sole the intent of stealing funds. After digging through the on-chain transactions to find those affected, the official sent a total of $40k worth of DMG to those affected at an exchange rate of $0.40 per DMG, hoping to make sure everyone who lost funds were made whole.


incident_title: 20210314_Roll_CSR
incident_date: 2021-03-14
incident_description:
The tokens were taken from a Roll hot wallet, which not only received social tokens from Roll’ multisig but was also sponsored by Roll multisig owners.


incident_title: 20200922_UniCat_S
incident_date: 2020-09-22
incident_description:
According to ZenGo researcher Alex Manuskin, at least one of its users lost more than $140,000 worth of Uniswap's UNI tokens even after they removed their funds from the protocol. Other users lost about $50,000 more.


incident_title: 20211028_AnubisDAO_S
incident_date: 2021-10-28
incident_description:
Investors claim that the creators of a newly-launched dog coin project defrauded them out of a combined total of $60 million in ETH after the funds vanished from the project’s liquidity pool.


incident_title: 20200926_GemSwap_S
incident_date: 2020-09-26
incident_description:
On September 26, the SushiSwap imitation project named GemSwap was exposed and LP was taken away. The query found that the project posted a tweet at around 15:00 today and revealed that it was attacked by the developer of "whatitdobb". It is understood that the project completed the liquidity migration earlier today, but the developer who initiated the attack had The relevant permission was obtained and the tokens in the liquidity pool were able to be taken away. The specific losses caused by this attack are currently unclear.


incident_title: 20210520_PancakeBunny_CSR
incident_date: 2021-05-20
incident_description:
This incident was due to a bug in the protocol that uses the AMM-based oracle, i.e., PancakeSwap, to measure the price of specific PancakeSwap LPs (BNB-BUSDT/BNB-BUNNY).


incident_title: 20210619_VisorFinance_S
incident_date: 2021-06-19
incident_description:
The attacker had obtained access to an account that managed some of the Hypervisor admin functions. The attacker was able to withdraw funds from deposits that were not yet placed into the LP positions. The withdraw amounted to 500k from a TVL of 3M. (possible inside job?: @mxwtnbuhh looks like VisorFinance deployer just emergency withdrew from their vaults and sent everything to tornado cash https://twitter.com/mxwtnb/status/1406236260495245312)


incident_title: 20201030_EtherCrash_S
incident_date: 2020-10-30
incident_description:
the EtherCrash cold wallet that claimed to be "the most mature and largest gambling game in Ethereum" was stolen, with a loss of about 2.5 million U.S. dollars. for


incident_title: 20211126_VisorFinance_S
incident_date: 2021-11-26
incident_description:
The malicious contract carried out its attack in repeated operations of diminishing returns. https://etherscan.io/address/0x1a252684a15f07c97ec20b2d6bb380d7410058da
While we cannot see the contract code, it is easy to understand that the attack vector relied on large swaps to manipulate the Uniswap V3 pool's current price. Given the steep gradient in the liquidity distribution of this pair, we see that it is an attractive candidate for price manipulation, as after an initial threshold where liquidity is highly concentrated, impacting the price requires a relatively small amount of assets.


incident_title: 20200920_SodaFinance_S
incident_date: 2020-09-20
incident_description:
Soda.Finance was hacked by malicious actors, who subsequently liquidated over 400 ETH (around $160,000) from the Soda loan pool.


incident_title: 20210808_Zerogoki_S
incident_date: 2021-08-08
incident_description:
Zerogoki was attacked due to compromised price oracle. The attacker provides a price oracle signed by legitimate private keys, which contain crafted number of tokens to be swapped. However the reason why the attacker can construct a valid signature is unknown yet.


incident_title: 20190625_Synthetix_S
incident_date: 2019-06-25
incident_description:
Synthetix founder Kain Warwick announced that an error that netted one legitimate user over $1 billion in profit has been fixed and that the user rolled back all the transactions in exchange for a bug bounty.


incident_title: 20211001_AutoSharkFinance_S
incident_date: 2021-10-01
incident_description:
On Friday Autoshark was the subject of an attempted flash loan exploit. The exploit was of debatable efficiency however, with the attacker collecting $580,000 after paying close to $1 million in transaction fees. 


incident_title: 20200111_Fulcrum_C
incident_date: 2020-01-11
incident_description:
1Inch team said that "All started on January 11, 2020, when Fulcrum team released their own Flash Loans feature on the Ethereum Mainnet, and we happened to find a very critical vulnerability in it. We discovered that $2.5M of user funds from 3 pools could be stolen within a single transaction. We prepared our own smart contract to perform a white-hat hack to protect user funds. Since the vulnerable smart contract was published less than 48h before we discovered the issue, there was a very high chance malicious attackers could exploit it, and we wanted to assure that this wouldn’t happen."


incident_title: 20211130_MonoX_CSR
incident_date: 2021-11-30
incident_description:
Over $31 million stolen, across two chains, via a price manipulation of the project’s native token, MONO.
Two attacks hit the protocol in swift succession.First, ~$19.4M was stolen on Polygon and just 17 minutes later, the same attack vector was used on Ethereum, taking a further ~$12M.
First, we wanted to give you a quick breakdown of the addresses that have lost funds and each of these wallets are on top of mind to make right. 406 ETH and 15,523 Polygon addresses have been affected by the hack, and of these addresses, 42 ETH and 2,653 Polygon have been actively LPing in more than just 1 pool.


incident_title: 20220328_BNBDEFI_S
incident_date: 2022-03-28
incident_description:
A Rug Pull occurred in BNB DEFI, and the DEFI token fell by 68% in a short time. At present, the project has closed the community, and DEFI tokens have been exchanged for about 255 BNB.


incident_title: 20211211_AscendEX_SR
incident_date: 2021-12-11
incident_description:
On Sunday, AscendEX announced via Twitter that it had identified a number of unauthorized transactions from one of its hot wallets on Saturday. Assets not affected have been transferred to cold wallets while the investigation is carried out, the exchange added.


incident_title: 20220118_Crosswise_S
incident_date: 2022-01-18
incident_description:
The main reason for this attack is that the project side used the wrong method to get ‘msgSender’ so that the contract Owner rights change could be bypassed. 
The Crosswisefi project does not adopt openZepplin standard writing method for the ‘_msgSender()’ function of MasterChef, and there are loopholes. This allows an attacker to circumvent the onlyOwner restriction by constructing a malicious’ calldata ‘implementation.


incident_title: 20201008_DeFiSaver_S
incident_date: 2020-10-08
incident_description:
The key to this vulnerability is that an attacker can use the takeOrder function to call any function of the target contract _addresses[0] arbitrarily, and the parameters passed into the takeOrder function are user-controllable, and there are no checks or restrictions on the parameters. Therefore, in order to avoid such problems, it is recommended that the project party use a whitelist strategy to check the parameters such as _callData passed in by the user.


incident_title: 20210915_Nowswap_S
incident_date: 2021-09-15
incident_description:
On September 15, 2021, the NowSwap DEX was the victim of a hack.  The attacker exploited a vulnerability in the protocol’s code that enabled them to extract $1 million in tokens from the project. The Uranium Finance and NowSwap hacks were made possible by an error when updating the smart contract’s code.  The original code of the contract contained a value, K, of 1,000 in three different places.  The update to the code changed this value in two places but not the third.


incident_title: 20211014_IndexedFinance_CSR
incident_date: 2021-10-14
incident_description:
In order to control slippage, the rate at which the resulting changes in weights are enacted within the pool is limited, creating a temporary discrepancy ripe for manipulation.The attacker was able to take advantage of the above by using flash loans of the other assets in the pool to buy out UNI, decreasing the extrapolated value due to the delay in updating UNI’s weight decrease.


incident_title: 20210318_SILFinance_S
incident_date: 2021-03-18
incident_description:
SIL.FINANCE has experienced usage issues during launch at UTC 16:00, March 18, 2021, “deposit/withdraw” function had been suspended after the team discovered the situation and immediately paused the SIL Master Contract using 4/6 Multi-Sign dev wallet.


incident_title: 20220417_Beanstalk_SCR
incident_date: 2022-04-17
incident_description:
The attacker borrowed close to $1 billion in cryptocurrency assets through a service called Aave, exchanged them for a 67 percent share in the Beanstalk project, voted through their own proposal to withdraw the entire treasury, and returned the borrowed funds — all in less than 13 seconds.
The entire attack was based on a vulnerability that enabled the attacker to exploit the protocol’s majority vote governance system. To put it simply, any individual with a 2/3rd share (a supermajority) of the vote can pass a BIP at any time.
Normally, the execution of a BIP on-chain requires a minimum of 7 days but leveraging the emergencyCommit function helped the attacker bypass this (a 2/3rd share was necessary for execution)


incident_title: 20200811_NUGS_S
incident_date: 2020-08-11
incident_description:
Two small-scale token projects, NUGS and NEXE, appeared to have committed "travel fraud" shortly after being launched on Uniswap. The NUGS project blamed this move on a "smart contract vulnerability". On its official telegram channel, NUGS stated that its smart contract is now "unfixable." Another project, NEXE, is also suspected to have gone, and the social media account of this project has been deleted.


incident_title: 20220205_Meterio_CSR
incident_date: 2022-02-05
incident_description:
The attack started at ~6am PST on February 5th, when the attacker maliciously minted a substantial amount of BNB and wETH tokens, draining the bridge reserve of its BNB and wETH before all bridge transactions could be halted by Meter.The hacker was able to exploit a vulnerability in the deposit function, which allowed them to fake BNB or ETH transfers. Meter.io announced that Meter Passport (a cross-chain bridge extension) automatically wraps and unwraps Gas Tokens (such as ETH and BNB) for user convenience. However, the contract did not prohibit the wrapped ERC20 Token from interacting directly with the native Gas Token, nor did it properly transfer and verify the correct amount of WETH transferred from the caller address.


incident_title: 20210213_CreamFinance_CSR
incident_date: 2021-02-13
incident_description:
The attackers' contract made the Homora code “believe” that their malicious contract was one of their own in order to manipulate internal debt numbers in their system.An attacker exploited Alpha Homora V2 using a series of complex transactions, which involved flashloans. 


incident_title: 20220217_RigoBlock_S
incident_date: 2022-02-17
incident_description:
RigoBlock has been hacked. All tokens in Dragos but ETH and USDT are at risk due to an exploited protocol vulnerability.


incident_title: 20210308_DODO_CSR
incident_date: 2021-03-08
incident_description:
DODO was hacked for $2 million using a fake token attack. The exploits targeted several DODO V2 Crowdpools, namely the WSZO, WCRES, ETHA, and FUSI pool.In summary, there are two individuals involved in this exploit. We will refer to them as Individual A and Individual B.Individual B has all the hallmarks of a frontrunning bot.


incident_title: 20211105_bzx_S
incident_date: 2021-11-05
incident_description:
The ethereum deployment of bZx protocol is safe following the compromise of an individual bZx developer’s computer and their private keys.
This attack granted the hacker access to the content of the bZx Developers wallet, and also the private keys to the BSC and Polygon deployment of bZx Protocol. After gaining control of BSC and Polygon the hacker drained the BSC and Polygon protocol, then upgraded the contract to allow draining of all tokens that the contracts had given unlimited approval.
What Went Wrong?The BSC and Polygon implementation administrative private keys have not yet been transferred to the DAO yet. Therefore the BSC and Polygon Deployment did not have the protection of the DAO. When the developers private keys were compromised in a phishing attack the hacker gained access to not only the individual developers personal funds, but also gained access to the bZx deployment on BSC and Polygon. From there the hacker was able to upgrade the contract and perform an attack on users of the protocol and funds held within the protocol.
[unlimited approve funds attack]"


incident_title: 20211023_AlphaFinance_S
incident_date: 2021-10-23
incident_description:
The implicit assumptions on Uniswap V2 resulted in 20 addresses on Alpha Homora V2 being impacted and lost a total of 40.93 ETH to miners who extracted this value.


incident_title: 20210914_KlondikeFinance_S
incident_date: 2021-09-14
incident_description:
Klondike Finance was attacked by hackers, with a total loss of approximately 35,281.71 KXUSD (6.5629 WETH).


incident_title: 20200824_YFValue_S
incident_date: 2020-08-24
incident_description:
The team identified an exploit for the YFV staking pool that enables malicious actors to individually reset timers for staked YFV.  There is a risk of being locked in $170 million in funds.


incident_title: 20210527_BurgerSwap_S
incident_date: 2021-05-27
incident_description:
Overall, the attacker reportedly managed to steal 4,400 BNB (worth around $1.6 million), 22,000 BUSD and 1.4 million USDT stablecoins, 2.5 Ethereum ($6,800), 432,000 BURGER ($3.2 million), and 142,000 xBURGER ($1 million)—for a total of over $7.2 million. Missing sanity check on K: The swap function is supposed to ***verify x*y >= k*** which basically verifies that the contract got enough input tokens required to do the swap. Without this check, you can trigger a swap to swap a million token X for a million token Y but only pay 1 token X to the pool while withdrawing the million token Y. Without this check, the pool has no way to ensure that the user paid the input tokens they committed in the swap.(@Mudit__Gupta)


incident_title: 20211121_Formation
incident_date: 2021-11-21
incident_description:
The main reason for this incident is that the project party underestimated the impact of fee on totalTokens when designing the function swapIn, and ignored the impact of decimal point accuracy between different tokens.


incident_title: 20201112_Akropolis_S
incident_date: 2020-11-12
incident_description:
Akropolis was attacked by exploiting its flawed handling of the deposit logic in its SavingsModule smart contract***.This incident was due to a bug in the protocol without (1) validating the supported tokens and (2) enforcing reentrancy protection on the deposit logic. The exploitation leads to a large number of pooltokens minted without being backed by valuable assets. The redemption of these minted pooltokens is then exercised to drain about 2.0mn DAI from the affected YCurve and sUSD pools.This hack is initialized from a malicious ERC20-like contract (located at 0xe230). This malicious contract implements a hook that will be invoked whenever the transferFrom() (function signature: 0x23b872dd) is being called.


incident_title: 20211230_SashimiSwap_S
incident_date: 2021-12-30
incident_description:
On December 30, BEOSIN’s Eagle Eye alerted that the Sashimi Swap was hacked at 09:06 UTC on December 30, with a total loss of nearly USD 200,000. 
The hacker then removed the liquidity and gets WETH, and finally the hacker repeated the profit twice with the obtained WETH, and returned WETH tokens lent by flash loan. The total profits nearly $200,000: 6,261.304 uni, 4,466,096 Sashimi and 63,762 usdt.


incident_title: 20210830_CreamFinance_CSR
incident_date: 2021-08-30
incident_description:
At approximately 12pm on 31st August (UTC +8), C.R.E.A.M. Finance was exploited for 462,079,976 in AMP tokens and 2,804.96 ETH tokens.There was a main exploit along with a smaller copy-cat. The copy-cat exploit address has withdrawal history from Binance. We are working with Binance to identify the second perpetrator. We will forward all relevant information to law enforcement authorities and prosecute to the fullest extent of the law. The AMP token contract implements ERC777, which has the _callPostTransferHooks hook that triggers tokensReceived() function that was implemented by the recipient. The reentrancy opportunity related to ERC-777-style transfer hooks allowed the exploiter to nest a second borrow() function inside the token transfer() before the initial borrow() was updated. This was used over 17 transactions


incident_title: 20220411_MarvinInu_S
incident_date: 2022-04-11
incident_description:
Marvin Inu’s cross-chain bridge was hacked, and tokens worth 110 ETH were stolen and sold, causing a sharp drop in price. The project party has closed the cross-chain bridge and fixed the loopholes. At the same time, it has adjusted the purchase tax to 0%, and promised to repurchase and destroy the tokens to make up for this loss after the price fluctuations stabilize.


incident_title: 20211228_DEXTools_S
incident_date: 2021-12-28
incident_description:
A fake MetaMask token project has scammed traders out of $1.8 million worth of ETH.
The scammers hacked the DEXTools app's front end to convince users that their fake token was legitimate.
The fake MetaMask token is the third major scam to hit the crypto space over the holiday season.


incident_title: 20200630_VETH_S
incident_date: 2020-06-30
incident_description:
The hacker stole 919,299 VETH (worth $900,000) using only 0.9ETH. After the attack, VETH officially stated that the contract was used by the UX improvement it placed in transferForm(), which was their fault


incident_title: 20210720_SanshuInu_S
incident_date: 2021-07-20
incident_description:
Using the mechanism of deflation token KEANU to attack the reward vulnerabilities in the Memestake contract deployed by Sanshu Inu, the attacker finally made a profit of about 56 ETH. The attacker leverages the deflation mechanism of the ERC20 token to manipulate the reward calculation of the Memstake smart contract.


incident_title: 20220110_CityDAO_S
incident_date: 2022-01-10
incident_description:
After compromising an administrator’s accounts, the attacker set up an announcement about a fake “land drop” that pointed users to a phishing site.  Using Discord webhooks, the attacker was able to ensure that the announcement would immediately pop up for each user as they logged into the Discord server.
On the phishing site, the users connected their wallets to receive the land drop.  This allowed the attacker to create fraudulent transactions that the users approved which sent assets to the attacker.  In total, about $95,000 in cryptocurrency was stolen in the attack.coindesk.


incident_title: 20220210_BuildFinance_S
incident_date: 2022-02-10
incident_description:
As per the announcement, the attacker was able to successfully access the DAO treasury due to the structure of the Build DAO governance model; as it seems the attacker simply managed to corral enough governance tokens to grab power, and the DAO doesn’t seem to have put mechanisms in place to defend the treasury against such a power grab.
Once the attacker had the power, he minted 1,107,600 BUILD ($1.7 million) in three transactions and drained the majority of the funds in the liquidity pools on the Balancer and Uniswap DEXs. The attacker then took control of the Balancer pools via the governance contract and drained the remaining funds, including 130,000 METRIC tokens, and tried to sell these tokens wherever there was any liquidity, causing intense sell pressure on the assets.


incident_title: 20220330_BasketDAO_S
incident_date: 2022-03-30
incident_description:
According to BasketDAOOrg's official Twitter, there is a vulnerability in BMIZapper, which caused users to lose about 1.2 million US dollars.


incident_title: 20211211_SorbetFinance_S
incident_date: 2021-12-11
incident_description:
The core functionality of the vulnerable smart contract was to enable users to enter G-UNI pools with only one token, rather than being required to provide an equal proportion of two from the get-go. This required the smart contract to conduct a swap on a DEX aggregator before depositing the funds in the pool. This swap was done on 1inch, which requires other smart contracts to pass certain addresses and calldata generated by the 1inch API to execute the right functions on the 1inch smart contract.
Enabling the smart contract at risk to conduct arbitrary low-level calls that were intended to only execute swaps on 1inch made it possible for the potential exploit to occur. For any developer reading this, never enable a smart contract to take arbitrary addresses and call data arguments if a) everyone can call this function, b) you don’t do sufficient checks on what the addresses and calldata that were passed should be, and c) users provide this smart contract with approvals.


incident_title: 20210718_ArrayFinance_S
incident_date: 2021-07-18
incident_description:
First, the attacker invoked the buy function of the Array Finance. The attacker gained 430 ARRAY tokens minted by the Array Finance using 45.91 WETH.
Then the attacker invoked the joinPool function of a closed source contract (Array Collater - 0xa800cda5) five times. He/she deposited 676,410.58 DAI + 679,080.46 USDC + 901.82 WETH + 20 WBTC + 20 renBTC and gained 726.38 aBPT tokens minted by Array Collater.
The attacker invoked the sell function to burn 430 ARRAY tokens and got 77.17 aBPT tokens.
At last, the attacker invoked the exitPool function of the Array Collater. He/she burned 804.55 aBPT tokens obtained in previous two steps and obtained 748,271.55 DAI + 751,225.08 USDC + 997.62 WETH + 22.63 WBTC + 22.74 renBTC.
From Figure 2, we can find the attacker gains profits in step 5 (Figure 2: Invoke the sell function). That's because the obtained 77.17 aBPT tokens are more valuable than the 49.9142 WETH deposited in step 3 (Figure 2: Invoke the buy function). In the following, we will analyze the code to understand why this attack can happen.


incident_title: 20210127_refi
incident_date: 2021-01-27
incident_description:
Weibo user “CryptoBlanker” broke the news: the refi.finance project party directly used the reserved setBoardroom() function to change the Boardroom address to the address it deployed. Light BAS was taken away 2,600, worth 111 ETH (about 144,000 US dollars).


incident_title: 20210703_DEXTools_S
incident_date: 2021-07-03
incident_description:
The DEX trading tool DEXTools (DEXT) tweeted that it was recently hacked and affected some DEXT holder


incident_title: 20210131_PopcornSwap_S
incident_date: 2021-01-31
incident_description:
Another DeFi project popcornswap on Binance Smart Chain has gone. It is reported that some users said in the community that the project used cake's LP, the contract was open source but there was no audit, and the LP was run in less than two hours. Currently, there are more than 40,000 BNB in ​​the wallet and no action is taken.


incident_title: 20220415_RikkeiFinance_S
incident_date: 2022-04-15
incident_description:
The attacker (address: 0x803e0930357ba577dc414b552402f71656c093ab) found a vulnerability in the source code of the PriceOracle smart contract. By manipulating this vulnerability, the attacker could make unauthorized changes to contract addresses used by the PriceOracle.
The attacker deployed a fake ChainLink contract to return incorrect prices and then directed the PriceOracle to this fake contract. This action was completed on two instances involving two transactions in quick succession.


incident_title: 20211226_MetaSwap_S
incident_date: 2021-12-26
incident_description:
Blockchain security company PeckShield has alerted investors of a possible rug pull event after identifying a massive 46.99% price drop on MetaSwap’s MGAS token.


incident_title: 20210221_PrimitiveFinance_S
incident_date: 2021-02-21
incident_description:
No user funds lost. A critical vulnerability was discovered in Primitive Finance smart contracts that would allow all funds to be stolen from Primitive Finance users according to their token allowances. There were 88 potential victims, most with infinite approvals for important tokens, such as WETH or DAI, and with overall holdings of well over $10M. $1.3M of these funds were vulnerable at the same time, the rest only when/if converted to WETH, DAI, or other approved tokens.


incident_title: 20200914_Chainlink_S
incident_date: 2020-09-14
incident_description:
Nine Chainlink node operators were subjected to so-called "spam attacks." The attackers obtained approximately 700 ETH (worth approximately $335,000 at the time) from their "hot wallets".


# IncidentSource

source_link:
https://www.coindesk.com/people-behind-crypto-protocol-defi100-may-have-absconded-with-32m-in-investor-funds


source_link:
https://opensea.io/assets/ethereum/0xe18a32192ed95b0fe9d70d19e5025f103475d7ba/57896044618658097711785492504343953927315557066662158946655541218820101244713


source_link:
https://inspexco.medium.com/merlin-labs-incident-analysis-improper-mint-amount-calculation-on-mintfor-function-6a84c4fb0ec3


source_link:
https://cryptopotato.com/defi-protocol-bzx-hacked-again-8-million-worth-of-eth-link-stablecoins-drained/


source_link:
https://peckshield.medium.com/bzx-hack-ii-full-disclosure-with-detailed-profit-analysis-8126eecc1360


source_link:
https://medium.com/@Knownsec_Blockchain_Lab/knowsec-blockchain-lab-xsurge-flash-loan-attack-analysis-b57b75ce6a30


source_link:
https://www.bsc.news/post/stablemagnet-and-others-rugpull-22m-in-stablecoin-through-unverified-swap-code


source_link:
https://medium.com/@Knownsec_Blockchain_Lab/knownsec-blockchain-lab-inverse-finance-is-under-attack-with-huge-losses-4f143c517d14


source_link:
https://twitter.com/CertiKCommunity/status/1491483014467047437?s=19https://twitter.com/CertiKCommunity/status/1491483014467047437?s=19


source_link:
https://leofinance.io/@leofinance/wrapped-leo-white-paper-investigative-report-lp-refunds-and-wleo-relaunch


source_link:
https://cointelegraph.com/news/hacker-steals-balancers-comp-allowance-in-second-attack-within-24-hours


source_link:
https://cointelegraph.com/news/bent-finance-confirms-pool-exploit-advises-investors-to-withdraw-funds


source_link:
https://slowmist.medium.com/slowmist-a-brief-analysis-of-the-story-of-the-sushi-swap-attack-c7bc6709adea


source_link:
https://cointelegraph.com/news/as-token-price-rises-and-reputation-mends-sushiswap-foils-midnight-exploit


source_link:
https://coinyuppie.com/four-combinations-of-hackers-analysis-of-attacks-on-wiener-doge-last-kilometer-medamon-and-pidao-projects/


source_link:
https://www.theblock.co/post/112339/creative-attacker-steals-76000-in-rune-by-giving-out-free-tokens


source_link:
https://www.coindesk.com/mempool-manipulation-enabled-theft-of-8m-in-makerdao-collateral-on-black-thursday-report


source_link:
https://medium.com/@whiterabbit_hq/black-thursday-for-makerdao-8-32-million-was-liquidated-for-0-dai-36b83cac56b6


source_link:
https://medium.com/originprotocol/urgent-ousd-has-hacked-and-there-has-been-a-loss-of-funds-7b8c4a7d534c


source_link:
https://peckshield.medium.com/bearn-fi-incident-inconsistent-asset-denomination-between-vault-strategy-9b24b68ab1c0


source_link:
https://medium.com/rai-finance/hacker-has-returned-part-of-the-rai-stolen-due-to-a-loophole-in-the-chainswap-contract-9b1161eafc51


source_link:
https://cointelegraph.com/news/certik-dissects-the-axion-network-incident-and-subsequent-price-crash


source_link:
https://medium.com/visorfinance/post-mortem-for-vvisr-staking-contract-exploit-and-upcoming-migration-7920e1dee55a


source_link:
https://www.theblockcrypto.com/post/125170/olympusdao-mistake-lets-user-spend-50000-to-buy-1-43-million-in-ohm


source_link:
https://www.vice.com/en/article/epxb8m/crypto-protocol-publicly-announces-flaw-users-relentlessly-owned-by-hackers


source_link:
https://www.vice.com/en/article/bvn7k3/white-hat-hacker-returns-dollar1-million-stolen-in-crypto-theft-disaster


source_link:
https://medium.com/@Knownsec_Blockchain_Lab/knownsec-blockchain-lab-evodefi-attack-event-analysis-e1cba8a789ce


source_link:
https://watchpug.medium.com/aperocket-finance-performance-fee-minting-incident-root-cause-analysis-b959c1e963ba


source_link:
https://www.aliens.com/livenews/latest/wegrocoin-wegro-suffers-rug-pull-developer-snatches-over-1000-bnb


source_link:
https://www.coindesk.com/business/2021/11/11/curve-wars-heat-up-emergency-dao-invoked-after-clear-governance-attack/


source_link:
https://www.certik.io/blog/announcements/exploitingasmartcontractwithoutsecurityvulnerabilitiesanalysisoftrueseignioragedollarattackevent


source_link:
https://medium.com/@Knownsec_Blockchain_Lab/wault-finance-flash-loan-security-incident-analysis-368a2e1ebb5b


source_link:
https://lunaray.medium.com/the-vesper-lend-loan-pool-on-rari-fuse-was-attacked-again-and-lost-about-1-million-3462ecca127b


source_link:
https://cointelegraph.com/news/many-yield-farmers-lost-more-than-they-bargained-for-when-they-trusted-this-defi-dev


source_link:
https://itwire.com/business-it-news/security/ethereum-gambling-game-loses-us$2-5m-in-alleged-inside-job.html


source_link:
https://github.com/GammaStrategies/uniswapv3-risk-mitigation/blob/main/Notes%20on%20Uniswap%20v3%20Risk%20Mitigation.md


source_link:
https://anchainai.medium.com/soda-finance-hack-could-formal-verification-have-prevented-it-code-included-71b6e9f94ea5


source_link:
https://www.coindesk.com/business/2021/12/13/crypto-exchange-ascendex-hacked-losses-estimated-at-77m/


source_link:
https://medium.com/@Knownsec_Blockchain_Lab/knownsec-blockchain-lab-crosswise-attack-incident-analysis-f330f5b350ae


source_link:
https://slowmist.medium.com/slowmist-how-was-the-310-000-dai-of-defi-saver-users-stolen-91de37a4ade2


source_link:
http://www.antihackingonline.com/potential-risk-of-cve/cve-2022-25335-about-rigoblock-dragos-design-weakness-23rd-feb-2022/


source_link:
https://blockcast.cc/news/peckshield-brief-analysis-of-burgerswap-lightning-loan-attack-the-logic-behind-the-defi-protocol-is-more-important-than-the-code/


source_link:
https://medium.com/@Knownsec_Blockchain_Lab/knownsec-blockchain-lab-formation-fi-flash-loan-security-incident-analysis-8a24555f8356


source_link:
https://formation-fi.medium.com/greetings-formation-fi-community-supporters-investors-and-friends-b09d673cda8a


source_link:
https://mirror.xyz/0xaB265E6124dedE46C85336e720521209d51E403e/emKEN5R-Mp3KTY1YKpTTq79O1x_oRzK3FeSOVt2bgEM


source_link:
https://coinyuppie.com/the-total-amount-of-blockchain-ecological-theft-in-april-was-about-280-million-us-dollars-which-is-more-than-21-typical-security-incidents/


source_link:
https://www.coindesk.com/business/2022/01/14/blockchain-city-citydao-falls-victim-to-95k-hack-via-discord/


source_link:
https://www.theblockcrypto.com/post/134180/build-finance-dao-suffers-hostile-governance-takeover-loses-470000


source_link:
https://coinyuppie.com/in-march-there-were-more-than-30-on-chain-security-incidents-and-the-loss-amounted-to-more-than-700-million-us-dollars/


source_link:
https://cointelegraph.com/news/metaswap-gas-incommunicado-as-experts-link-mgas-price-drop-to-rug-pull


source_link:
https://primitivefinance.medium.com/postmortem-on-the-primitive-finance-whitehack-of-february-21st-2021-17446c0f3122


source_link:
https://primitivefinance.medium.com/whitehack-by-primitive-finance-most-funds-are-safe-user-action-required-4dd31c387b8


